China Removes Nine Military Officials From Legislature Days Before Two Sessions
The NPC Standing Committee stripped 19 lawmakers — including nine from the PLA — of their credentials on Thursday, the latest in a series of military disciplinary actions that have reshaped senior ranks across multiple service branches since 2023.
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China's National People's Congress Standing Committee announced on Thursday the removal of 19 delegates from the legislature's rolls, including nine military officials. The action came five days before the Two Sessions — the annual meetings of the NPC and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference — are due to open in Beijing on March 4.
Among the military figures removed were Li Qiaoming, commander of the PLA Ground Force, and Shen Jinlong, a former PLA Navy commander. Provincial officials removed included Sun Shaochong, the former party chief of Inner Mongolia. The NPC Standing Committee gave no official reason for the removals, as is standard practice in such cases.
A Continuing Pattern
The removals are the latest in a series of military disciplinary actions that have intensified since 2023. In October 2025, nine senior generals were removed from their NPC positions in a similar round, according to state media reports at the time. In 2023–24, the Rocket Force — China's nuclear and strategic missile command — lost its commander Li Yuchao and political commissar Xu Zhongbo, along with several other senior officers, in what Chinese state media described as a crackdown on procurement corruption.
Most notably, in early February, the Central Military Commission confirmed the removal of Zhang Youxia from the vice-chairmanship of the CMC. Zhang was accused of "serious violations of discipline and law" — the standard official formulation that typically refers to corruption. His removal was particularly significant because of his longstanding personal ties to Xi Jinping: Zhang's father and Xi's father served together during the revolutionary period, making Zhang widely regarded as one of Xi's closest allies in the military establishment, according to analysts including those at the Brookings Institution and the International Institute for Strategic Studies.
Xi Jinping has framed anti-corruption efforts as central to the party's survival. "Corruption is the biggest threat to the party," he has said on multiple occasions, and in recent remarks he described the campaign as "grave and complex."
What the Removals Mean — and Don't Mean
It is important to distinguish what NPC credential removal entails. Being stripped of legislative delegate status is a political and representational action — it does not by itself constitute criminal prosecution, military court-martial, or even formal party expulsion, though those steps may follow. In some past cases, NPC removal has preceded criminal proceedings; in others, it has not.
The cumulative scale, however, is striking. Multiple tracking efforts by academic and media analysts suggest that more than 50 senior military figures have faced some form of disciplinary action since Xi launched his "tigers and flies" anti-corruption campaign in 2013. The pace has visibly increased since 2023, touching senior ranks across the army, navy, Rocket Force, and strategic support structures.
Two broad interpretations compete among analysts. The first, which Beijing's official narrative supports, holds that the PLA genuinely suffered from deep-seated corruption — particularly in procurement, where kickbacks and fraud in weapons acquisition could directly undermine combat readiness. The Rocket Force cases, in particular, reportedly involved irregularities in missile procurement that had implications for China's nuclear deterrence posture. From this perspective, the disciplinary campaign is a necessary institutional cleanup, analogous to anti-corruption efforts that other militaries have periodically undertaken.
The second interpretation, favoured by many Western analysts but also voiced by some Chinese commentators, views the campaign as serving a dual purpose: addressing real corruption while simultaneously allowing Xi to reshape the military's loyalty structure. Every major anti-corruption drive in CPC history has carried a political dimension, and the removal of Zhang Youxia — a figure whose position rested on personal ties rather than factional patronage — complicates any purely administrative reading.
These two interpretations are not mutually exclusive. Corruption can be both real and politically convenient to prosecute.
Domestic and Regional Context
Within China, the anti-corruption campaign retains substantial public support, according to surveys and analyses of social media sentiment, though the opacity of the process makes independent assessment difficult. The party has framed each round of removals as evidence of institutional accountability rather than instability.
For China's neighbours, the question is whether the reshuffling affects PLA operational readiness. Taiwan, Japan, and India all monitor Chinese military leadership changes closely. Some defence analysts argue that the removal of compromised officers ultimately strengthens the PLA by replacing patronage appointees with more competent successors. Others worry about institutional disruption during a period when the PLA is modernising rapidly and when regional tensions — over Taiwan, the South China Sea, and the India-China border — remain elevated.
What to Watch at the Two Sessions
The March 4–11 sessions will set annual economic growth targets and signal policy priorities for 2026. The government is also expected to outline elements of its forthcoming planning cycle at a time when China faces slowing domestic growth, escalating US technology restrictions, and pressure from regional competitors.
The pre-session removal of delegates serves both a procedural and signalling function: it clears the legislature's rolls and communicates that discipline applies at every level. Whether this strengthens or weakens the PLA's institutional coherence will depend on who fills the vacated positions — and whether they are selected primarily for professional competence, political reliability, or both.
Sources
- BBC News, "China removes nine military officials ahead of key political meeting," 27 February 2026
- South China Morning Post, reporting on NPC removals and economic target adjustments, February 2026
- Xinhua / NPC Standing Committee official announcements
- Previous reporting on Rocket Force purge (2023–24) and October 2025 general removals, multiple international outlets
- Background analysis: Brookings Institution, IISS, and CSIS commentary on PLA anti-corruption campaigns
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⚠️ AI-Generated Content Notice
This article was generated using artificial intelligence and may contain factual errors, incomplete analysis, or hallucinations. While sources are cited and editorial review has been applied, readers should independently verify claims before relying on this analysis for decision-making.
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Draft prepared for publication — Tongzhi AI, 27 February 2026